Procreative Beneficence and Genetic Enhancement by Veit, Walter




Imagine a world where everyone is healthy, intelligent, long living
and happy. Intuitively this seems wonderful albeit unrealistic.
However, recent scientific breakthroughs in genetic engineering,
namely CRISPR/Cas bring the question into public discourse,
how the genetic enhancement of humans should be evaluated
morally. In 2001, when preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD)
and in vitro fertilisation (IVF), enabled parents to select between
multiple embryos, Julian Savulescu introduced the principle of
procreative beneficence (PPB), stating that parents have the
obligations to choose the child that is expected to have the
best life. In this paper I argue that accepting the PPB and
the consequentialist principle (CP) that two acts with the same
consequences are morally on par, commits one to accepting the
parental obligation of genetically enhancing one’s children.
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1 Introduction
Imagine a world where everyone is healthy, intelligent, long living and
happy. Intuitively this seems wonderful albeit unrealistic. However, re-
cent scientific developments in genetic engineering, namely CRISPR/Cas
bring the question into public discourse, how the genetic enhancement
of humans should be evaluated morally. In 2001, when preimplanta-
tion genetic diagnosis (PGD) and in vitro fertilisation (IVF), enabled
parents to select between multiple embryos, Julian Savulescu introduced
the principle of procreative beneficence (PPB), stating that parents have
the obligations to choose the child that is expected to have the best life
[11]. In this paper I argue that accepting the PPB and the consequential-
ist principle (CP) that two acts with the same consequences are morally
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on par, commits one to accepting the parental obligation to genetically
enhance their prospective children, i.e. embryos, a position Savulescu
doesn’t explicitly endorse but I argue is committed too. As the argu-
ment I provide may seem like a slippery slope, the largest part of this
paper is tasked with responding to a multitude of possible objections. I
will argue that even though there are differences between the application
of PPB and genetic enhancement of embryos, they do not demarcate a
relevant moral difference between the two in respect to their obligatori-
ness.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 I define and ex-
plicate various concepts that are related to genetic enhancement, i.e.
human enhancement, wellbeing and the principle of procreative benefi-
cence. Technological specifics and explanations of how genetic enhance-
ments work will for the most part be omitted in this paper dealing purely
with a normative question, i.e. should parents genetically enhance their
children if the technology was available. In Section 3 I formulate and
explain the argument that those who want to be parents have the obliga-
tion to genetically enhance their embryos. In Section 4 I anticipate and
evaluate a number of possible objections including, inequality, freedom
and welfare in the society. In Section 5 I conclude that even though
the consequences of the PPB application and genetic enhancements in
embryos might require different kinds of policies, these differences do not
provide sufficient reason to give the application of PPB and the parents
using genetic enhancements on their embryos a different moral standing.
2 Important concepts
According to Savulescu, Sandberg and Kahane there are two main senses
in which the term enhancement is used. “Functional enhancement, the
enhancement of some capacity or power (e.g. vision, intelligence, health)
and human enhancement, the enhancement of a human being’s life” [10,:
p. 3]. In most discussions surrounding the term enhancement, people
refer to the functional definition. In all cases of the functional enhance-
ments it is an open question whether the improvement of some capacity
makes the life of the person receiving the enhancement actually bet-
ter. It, therefore, is an open question what the moral stance on any
particular form of enhancement is. However, proponents of enhance-
ments usually use the latter definition. After all, Savulescu argues, it
is not “disease [. . . ] which is important, but its impact on a life in
ways that matter which is important. People often trade length of life
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for non-health related well-being” [11; p. 419]. The concept of human
enhancement, employed by Savulescu and others, is comparatively less
straightforward and requires further clarification as it is crucial for my
argument. Savulescu, Sandberg and Kahane jointly propose the follow-
ing definition for human enhancement; “[a]ny change in the biology or
psychology of a person which increases the chances of leading a good
life in the relevant set of circumstances” [10; p. 7]. According to this
welfarist definition, a conception of normality is not needed to define
enhancement as we do not define an enhancement as being better than
normal, but simply being better full stop. Medical treatments are there-
fore just a form of enhancements [10; p. 8]. Opponents of enhancements,
on the other hand are trying to argue that enhancing is something going
beyond treatment and is therefore not morally demanded. The welfarist
definition of enhancement is crucial to understand why parents have the
obligation to genetically enhance their children. Those who disagree be-
cause of adherence to a different account of enhancement are talking
about something different. If a genetic alteration in an embryo is not
expected to lead to a better life of that human, than it is simply not an
enhancement.
Furthermore, it is important to explicate the principle of procreative
beneficence (PPB): “Couples (or single reproducers) should select the
child, of the possible children they could have, who is expected to have
the best life, or at least as good a life as the others, based on the relevant
available information” [11; p. 415]. Savulescu proposed this principle
in a time when preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and in vitro
fertilisation (IVF) were highly debated, trying to convince even non-
consequentialists. However new technologies might enable us not only to
screen for genes but also change them. In his consequentialist framework
he himself thinks that parents have the obligation to genetically enhance
their children [10; p. 16]. The question arises whether the acceptance
of the PPB and the consequentialist principle (CP), that two acts with
the same consequences are morally on par, itself entails the parental
obligation to genetically enhance their embryos. In the following I shall
argue that this slippery slope cannot be avoided.
A crucial part for this argument is to define the expectancy of the
best possible life. This is a vague part of his argument, but what counts
as an enhancement hinges on how welfare is defined for which there are
several theories: hedonism, desire/preference-satisfaction, objective list
theories, see Griffin [2] and Parfit [7]. Savulescu has not assigned himself
to any particular theory, thus claiming to avoid some of their weaknesses:
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“I have not committed myself to any particular substantive
conception of the good life. That is a complex question as
old as philosophy itself. I believe the best life is a life of
objectively worthwhile activity that provides pleasure and is
desired.” [12; p. 286].
Instead he focuses on all -purpose goods that would according to all
of those welfare theories mentioned above count as enhancements e.g.
“Memory, self-discipline, impulse control, foresight, patience, sense of
humour, sunny temperament, empathy, imagination, sympathy, fairness,
honesty, and so on, capacity to live peaceably and socially with others”
[12; p. 284]. Surely some of this might harm us e.g. post-traumatic
disorders in conjunction with better memory and imagination, but what
matters is that they are expected to make a life go better. A final defini-
tion of welfare is not necessary for our account as long as we are able to
evaluate these all -purpose goods. Even if it turns out that there is only
one such all-purpose good satisfying the major theories of wellbeing, i.e.
hedonism, desire/preference-satisfaction and objective list theories, the
argument provided in the next section will require parents to genetically
enhance it in their children. Nevertheless, as we follow the welfarist defi-
nition of what an enhancement is with medical treatments being a subset
of enhancements, the set of all-purpose goods might be rather large, e.g.
a functioning heart, brain, lung, etc.
3 Obligation to genetically enhance embryos
There are at least two ways to argue for the position that the PPB
entails the obligation to genetically enhance embryos. One could argue
that selection out of possible children entails the selection out of possible
genetically enhanced embryos. After all one could possibly have a genet-
ically enhanced child. In that case genetic enhancements would simply
fall under the PPB and hence be obligatory. However, this is debatable
and is not necessary to accept my claim. For my argument to proceed
I will require an additional premise, which is the consequentialist prin-
ciple (CP). Consequentialists are only concerned with outcomes, how
these outcomes are achieved is morally irrelevant. Killing and letting die
are thus ceteris paribus morally equivalent. In order for my argument
to hold, I need to show that the outcomes of the PPB and genetic en-
hancements in embryos are morally on par. What is the crucial outcome
of PPB? It is the expectancy of the best life, which we are expected to
achieve with Savulescus all -purpose goods. To formulate my argument:
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(1) Those who want to be parents have the obligation to select the child
that is expected to have the best life, or at least as good a life as the
others, based on the relevant available information (= the PPB).
(2) Application of the PPB leads to the creation of children that are
expected to have the best life or a life at least as good as without the
application of the PPB, based on the relevant available information
(3) If act A and act B have the same expected consequences, then they
are morally on par. (= the CP)
(4) Genetic enhancements in embryos lead to the creation of children
that are expected to have the best life or a life at least as good
as without genetic enhancements, based on the relevant available
information.
(5) Therefore, those who want to be parents have the obligation to ge-
netically enhance their embryos.
From premise (1) follows, that (2) is obligatory for those who want to
be parents. As (2) and (4) have the same consequences, it follows from
the CP (3) that (4) is also obligatory for those who want to be parents
(5). As stated in the beginning, we are accepting the PPB, therefore
premise (1) & (2) and the CP (3). If someone, e.g. Savulescu would
want to refute the conclusion (5) without dropping one’s commitment to
(1), (2) & (3), only two ways remain. First, denying the truth of premise
(4). Second, denying that the conclusion follows from the premises as
the consequences of premise (2) and (4) differ in a morally relevant way.
Let me now turn to these considerations in section 4.
4 Objections and Defense
Keeping in mind that every position that refutes the conclusion, but is
inconsistent with premise (1), (2) or (3), is not a valid objection to the
argument I bring forward. One cannot deny the conclusion of an argu-
ment that takes the form, “if you accept these premises, you have to
accept this conclusion” by denying the truth of one of the premises. The
argument provided in this paper aims for just this sort of conclusion:
Philosophers accepting the CP and the PPB do not have a valid escape
from being charged with the slippery slope of advocating genetic en-
hancements. To narrow the scope of this paper I am not taking a stance
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on the matter of whether the CP or the PPB is right. Such an en-
deavor would require more than a single volume book. I only argue that
philosophers and researchers like Julian Savulescu, Anders Sandberg and
Guy Kahane should either bite the bullet of advocating human enhance-
ments or indeed stop being consequentialists advocating the PPB. The
objections that follow are then nothing more but misguided attempts of
stopping the ‘slippery slope’.
Let me begin with the seemingly, obvious objection that premise 4 is
false. An objection often put forward is that genetic enhancements have
risks that are too high or unknown and would make the life of the person
targeted go worse. I argue that this hinges on different conceptions of
what counts as an enhancement. First, it is clear that genetic alterations
do not necessarily increase the expected welfare of an agent. However
I am not concerned with genetic alterations per se, but with genetic
enhancements. No serious advocate of enhancements in humans would
deny the difficulties in achieving successful genetic alterations. In fact,
the terminology of philosophers and researchers advocating the PPB,
i.e. Savulescu, Sandberg & Kahane doesn’t allow for this objection. As
noted in section 2 they employ the welfarist definition of enhancement: A
genetic enhancement by definition increases the expected welfare of chil-
dren. The question whether genetic enhancements thus really increase
welfare is irrelevant, because premise (4) is in fact a tautology. Though
this may seem like a cheap way of justifying genetic enhancements in hu-
mans, this is what proponents of human enhancements are advocating:
Using genetic alterations when they are expected to improve the life of
a human embryo, including perhaps open-mindedness for the future of
the technology.
It can of course still be asked whether genetic alterations are tech-
nologically possible in such a way that they lead to the creation of a
child with higher expected well-being. This is an empirical question and
even if they currently are not, this doesn’t free us from the task of an-
swering this question. After all many questions in ethics are formulated
like this: one might argue that current technological limitations might
give society an obligation to invest heavily into research as the potential
benefits are enormous. However this is of no concern for my argument,
because even those who disagree with genetic enhancements ever being
technologically possible have to accept alleged empirical evidence. In
2015 Chinese researches released an article, showing that the gene edit-
ing of human embryos is in fact technologically possible. They used a
technique called CRISPR/Cas9 which makes it impossible to tell which
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genes are edited [4; p. 363-372].
Realizing that premise (4) being a tautology, cannot be false, and
conditionally accepting premise (1) – (3), any further objection against
the conclusion following from the premises might seem pointless. How-
ever one way to refuse the conclusion remains, that is denying that the
consequences of PPB application and genetic enhancements of embryos
are the same. Granted, it is obviously true that two acts may never
have the ‘same’ consequences, if we consider every possible consequence.
However these differences have to justify a different moral standpoint,
meaning that the PPB is obligatory, while genetic enhancements of em-
bryos are not. For two acts can be different in their goodness while,
nevertheless, still both being obligatory. A familiar example in line with
PPB would be the obligation to send your children to school and the
obligation to feed them.
Objections of this sort can be categorized in two ways. First, the
expected welfare of the child might differ between selecting and enhanc-
ing an embryo in a morally relevant way. Second, they might only be
morally equal in one respect, i.e. expected welfare of the child, while
leaving out other relevant consequences that differ between the two and
justify a different moral standing. Some objections might overlap as
consequences such as freedom or equality and their implications on the
welfare of the targeted embryo and overall/average welfare. The remain-
der of this paper has the purpose to explore and debunk a multitude of
such objections.
4.1 Degree and Precision
Concerning differences in wellbeing, Parens objects that genetic alter-
ations might be morally different from other welfare increasing proce-
dures of offspring because they have the potential to be much larger in
degree and precision [6; p. S7]. However concerning premise (4) this
objection is unsuccessful, because the consequence we want is explicably
the life that is expected to be best. If genetic enhancements do so much
better than mere selection than Parens’ objection would rather support a
moral priority of genetic enhancements against mere selection. However
some might object that genetic enhancements are less reliable in their
effects, therefore unprecise. That however is an empirical question and
doesn’t change the fact that these genetic alterations are expected to
make the targets life better. Though this is the most obvious objection
and should therefore be tackled first, it is also the least harmful to the
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argument provided in this paper.
4.2 Risk
Another objection often put forward against genetic enhancements is the
risk objection, i.e. that the PPB has far less risks to its application com-
pared to genetic alterations. Of course genetic alterations currently bear
risks much greater than mere embryo selection by IVF and PGD, which
do not change the genetic constitution of the embryo. However when
genetic alterations are expected to be overall more harmful than benefi-
cial, they do not count as genetic enhancements and are therefore ruled
out. If we cannot determine probabilities, than we cannot judge the
expectancy of the best life anyway. This critic of human enhancements
is rather meaningless against the welfarist definition of enhancements.
When it comes to risk, the opponents of genetic enhancements are at-
tacking a straw-man position that proponents of genetic enhancements
do not adhere to. Risk, degree and precision are empirical concerns not
only for the opponent of genetic enhancements, but also for enhancement
advocates who DO take them serious.
But even if the risk of harm is currently unknown or outweighs the po-
tential benefits, this doesn’t indicate that genetic enhancements should
be avoided. One could rather argue again that we should do research
until the expected benefits outweigh the medical risks of harm not stop
research altogether. Also the potential benefit to be gained by genetic
enhancements is much larger in degree than mere selection. Demanding
a risk of zero to the targeted agents is over-demanding, otherwise med-
ical treatments would never be at the point they are today. Still, this
is a factor that affects the expected well-being negatively and therefore
has to be considered in judging whether a genetic alteration counts as
an enhancement.
One might further object that, contrary to somatic gene therapy,
which only affects the targeted individual, germ-line interventions will
affect the offspring of the targeted embryo and the offspring of his off-
spring and so forth. . . However we are enhancing all-purpose goods like
intelligence and health. It seems implausible to claim that all-purpose
goods are always expected to increase welfare, but might not do so for
future generations. Even so, if in the future new scientific advances
change our subjective probability assessments, genetic alterations that
did not count as enhancements, could do so in the future and vice-versa.
However, it would then be the obligation of our hypothetical parent’s
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off-spring to ensure, that their own off-spring has the best life possible
and perhaps undo some of the changes to their gen-code. The PPB does
not indicate an obligation towards grandchildren, but only to our own
children. Different times and cultures may very well render different
genes beneficial, think of intelligence and the muscular labor in former
centuries.
Maybe it will be the case that those enhanced will be less well off than
unenhanced humans would have been, because they see themselves as
objects rather than subjects. A “natural” patient with paraplegia may
be better off than a “super-enhanced” guy with superiority in health,
intelligence, strength etc. but cannot deal with the fact that he is created
artificially, perhaps becomes an alcoholic or worse. If we had reason to
give this outcome a certain probability, it would have to be calculated
in whether we can judge a genetic alteration to be an enhancement or
not. Therefore, higher risks are no reason to justify a different moral
standing from PPB.
4.3 Harm
However even though the expected welfare of genetic enhancement in
embryos and the application of PPB are the same, the issue of potential
harm to the embryo could still justify a moral difference between the
two. The PPB seems to capture the intuition of parents being obligated
towards their children’s welfare. Harming would indeed be quite contrary
to this. Savulescu argues that genetic enhancements can harm an embryo
in a way mere selection cannot. He asks us to imagine an embryo A, who
was selected for existence but later develops cancer. As long as its life is
worth living, it cannot be said that we have harmed him, for he would
not have existed otherwise. However this still seems to be morally wrong.
If we genetically alter an embryo B and he develops cancer (assuming
his life is worse than it would have been without genetic alteration)
then we would have harmed him [11; p. 422]. Unlike the objection to
premise (4) we cannot disregard the harm objection by hinting at the
welfarist definition of enhancement. Genetic enhancements are expected
to lead to the best possible life. However harm is concerned with the
actual life, not the expected welfare. In this respect PPB and genetic
enhancements differ because the harm objection is successful against
genetic enhancement while it is not against PPB.
However Savulescus argument also implies, that parents that selected
an embryo with the expectancy of the highest welfare and turns out to
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have a higher wellbeing than the others, cannot claim that they bene-
fitted him. On the contrary parents that arranged their embryo to be
genetically enhanced and the embryo turns out to benefit from it, can
take credit for this. Imagine a couple both bearing a defective gene that
would certainly cause blindness in their child. IVF and PGD would not
be able to help them (and the child), however a genetic enhancement
would. According to the CP, failing to select for sight and blinding a
child would be morally equal, i.e. impermissible as they share the same
consequence. If such enhancement technology were available children
could justifiably condemn their parents, for having harmed them in the
sense that they did not give them this benefit. This might seem odd at
first, but using an ordinary example, we condemn parents who do not
send their children to school in order to ensure their education. In this
case we also use the term harm. The claim then that there is a moral
distinction between harming and failing to benefit requires a special kind
of argument that may not be compatible with the CP. I take on the view
that there is no relevant moral difference. As such the harm objection
that aims to establish a relevant moral difference between genetic en-
hancements and applying the PPB raises a benefit objection against the
PPB that parents do not actually benefit their children.
However, I have an additional argument against the harm objection
and that is the irrelevance of harm and benefit altogether. As indicated
in section 3 the morally relevant part of the PPB is the expectancy of the
best life, I argue that it is not selection of the best expected life that is
morally relevant but the creation of the best expected life. Using again
the example of a blind child or the child not being sent to school, it is ob-
vious how the term benefit and harm seem to be used interchangeably. If
refusing to provide benefits is the same as harming, than these categories
are not morally exclusive. Therefore if we take premise (3) serious, we
cannot argue for a moral difference between selecting and altering. The
only thing that matters is the creation of the indicated consequence wel-
fare. Those who disagree would have to solve the non-identity problem
of Parfit, which suggested that harming future individuals is not possi-
ble, because in acting in that way the people existing in the future are
completely different from those who would have otherwise existed, thus
would not have existed otherwise. This is under the assumption that
small events can change history dramatically. The same can be said
about long-term investments that would only benefit generations far in
the future. However, even when we do not harm future generations, we
still value actions as wrong that lead to worse lives than otherwise could
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have existed [8; p. 100-115]. The analogy to the PPB and genetic en-
hancements is obvious, as no one is harmed that would have otherwise
existed. Therefore I conclude that what matters for parents is not a life
being beneficial or harmful for their child but the creation of a “best
life” in a welfarist sense – providing further support for the thesis that
there is no relevant difference in their moral consequences. Let us now
turn to possible moral differences between selecting, i.e. the application
of PPB, and enhancing an embryo in areas other than the welfare of the
embryo. In the following I will explore freedom, equality and the welfare
of society.
4.4 Freedom
Let us first consider consequences like freedom, autonomy or missing
consent. The majority of philosophers refuse the view that it is imper-
missible to have children on grounds of their lacking consent for being
born. The notion of requiring consent from an embryo appears to most
philosophers unnecessary or perhaps more so incoherent. However in the
case of genetic enhancements on embryos this matter might be different,
for they could have existed without genetic enhancements. Still, there
are many therapies/treatments in medicine, that are often deemed to be
obligatory, even though there is no consent e.g. vaccination. Also ev-
eryone should be familiar with parents sending their children to school,
even though their children might not have given them their consent. As
a child I certainly wondered who gave my parents my permission to so.
But even granting that we can meaningfully speak of consent here and
it being morally relevant, the consequentialist framework requires us to
weigh the negative consequences against benefits of such genetic alter-
ations in order to justify a violation of consent. In fact freedom to choose
can be viewed as instrumental or even constitutive to welfare, but this
objection would be ruled out by the welfarist definition of enhancement.
If a genetic alteration undermines such it cannot count as an enhance-
ment. The question then becomes whether a genetic alteration does so
in general. Thinking of deleting a gene that causes deafness or blindness
suggests otherwise. In medicine there is often a clash between respect-
ing the autonomy of the patient and his welfare. But as Bostrom and
Roache highlight, considerations like missing consent cannot be applied
for embryos that by definition cannot give consent. Instead they argue,
we should make decisions in a way that would be in their interest, so
thinking in terms of their welfare [1; p. 22). Habermas claims that this
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goes against the freedom of the embryo [3; p. 62]. He calls this denying
the opportunity of being “the undivided author of his own life” [3; p.
63]. Again Bostrom and Roache argue that enhancements would not
decrease autonomy, but rather have the potential to increase it [1; p.
21]. Just as education makes us more autonomous, genetically increased
intelligence would serve the same purpose. If the mere existence of ge-
netic enhancements undermines our feeling of being autonomous beings,
than this is not an argument against genetic enhancements, but rather
exposes our concept of autonomy as nothing more than an illusion. If
children feel like they have to fulfill the plans of their parents, than this
might limit them in their freedom to be the “undivided author” of their
own lives, but this is an objection to a particular treatment of children.
Genetic enhancements have the aim to increase rather than limit ones
possible choices in life. If genetic enhancements make us free to do things
we would otherwise not have been able to, then this seems to be even
further support for genetic enhancements.
4.5 Equality
Suppose that besides the PPB, equality is also a morally relevant con-
sequence. There is a rather famous critic against genetic enhancements
from Mehlman and Botkin, i.e. them being too expensive and there-
fore even when all parents follow their obligation, the children of rich
parents will be far more enhanced or those of poor parents won’t get
any enhancements at all (1998). Why could this objection be applicable
to genetic enhancement but fail against the PPB? Applied as an ob-
jection against PPB, Savulescu explains that one would have to argue
that because selecting the child with the expectancy for the best life
will lead to more inequality, parents would have to create a child with
worse life prospects [12; p. 288], which seems to be counterintuitive. If
everyone applies the PPB there might rather be more equality rather
than less by eliminating the natural lottery and additionally making ev-
eryone better off. Under this argument we could accept both equality
and the PPB as compatible. However with genetic enhancements this
might not be possible. First let me defend my argument against the
intrinsic value of equality. Equality unlike freedom or welfare as a con-
cept always hinges on the relations between individuals. Contrary to
this, an enhancement that makes someone less equal, say by bringing
a genetically altered embryo into existence with the disposition for in-
telligence far above average (other things being equal), would increase
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inequality in genetic makeup. Concerning the worry of unequal access
through wealth, Savulescu argues that this is not an objection to the
PPB hence genetic enhancements, but to all purchases of benefits like
better education or healthcare. If equality matters then these benefits
should be available to all [12; p. 288]. The same obviously applies to
genetic enhancements. This is neither an objection against the PPB nor
the parental obligation to genetically enhance their embryos, but to how
equal the access to technologies in society is. Both consequentialist views
can very well coexist, e.g. if the state ensures equal access while parents
are only concerned with their child. Furthermore there are reasons to
believe that genetic enhancements enhancement will not affect inequal-
ity at all, or even decrease it as Bostrom and Roache [1; p.16] suggest by
making people “more equal”, like it is the case with Modafinil [9], the
same could hold for genetic enhancements. How inequality could affect
welfare, will be adressed in the following section.
4.6 Welfare
Another consequence of applying PPB is the effect on overall/average
welfare. The objection against the PPB is that it is too much focused on
the individual as opposed to the lives of everyone [12; p. 287]. Of course
the same objection can be applied to genetic enhancements. In fact even
if we state genetic enhancements might be good for the one who gets
them (by definition), they could decrease the overall/average welfare and
vice versa. Now referring back to freedom and equality we can account
for their instrumental or constitutive value to welfare in this part. The
implication of both equality and freedom on the individual welfare is by
definition accounted in what counts as an enhancement. However both
could have morally relevant implications on the overall/average welfare.
For instance, such a moral principle might lead to discrimination
of the unenhanced. However, Savulescu response is that discrimination
does not show that the PPB is wrong, but rather how people treat each
other, which is a different topic. Genetic enhancements in empathy,
sympathy and other “moral” capacities could very well decrease dis-
crimination to a level that is even lower than the discrimination we face
in an ‘unenhanced world’ [12; p. 288]. Also, the optimistic outlook that
increased intelligence, including emotional intelligence, should make ‘the
enhanced’ less likely to discriminate should not be disregarded. Even if,
in virtue of introducing genetic alterations as a new technology, this leads
to a new form of discrimination (against the unenhanced), we might sig-
88 KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy, 2018, 32(1): 75–92
nificantly decrease other forms of discrimination once ‘moral’ enhance-
ments are introduced. Though, akin to parents denying their children
vaccines, I suspect that it is much more likely that if there is any new
form of discrimination, then it will be directed against parents denying
their children the possibility of a better life, i.e. moral condemnation.
In analogy, I argue that just as we should not let scientific research into
vaccines be influenced by anti-vaccines parents, fearing moral condem-
nation, the introduction of genetic alterations for humans should not be
stopped by set of parents unwilling to use the new technology. Both
act against the interest of their child and perhaps just as in the case of
vaccines deserve moral condemnation. In fact, vaccines are just a form
of enhancement.
The ‘discrimination-objection’ further requires the possibility of dis-
tinguishing between the enhanced and unenhanced. With the new tech-
nology CRISPR/Cas9 it is, however, impossible to find out which genes
were altered or edited [4]. The unenhanced might not even know that
they have not received enhancements. Even if there won’t be bla-
tantly obvious discrimination of the unenhanced, we may argue that
there will be discrimination in competition like work, because the un-
enhanced might on average simply be less efficient. The discrimination
then would be based however, on differences in skill rather than a na¨ıve
enhanced/unenhanced distinction. But first such a treatment does al-
ready take place and is generally not regarded as discrimination. If
some parents are able to afford a better or further education for their
children, e.g. tutoring, we neither prohibit such practices nor are we able
to provide good counter-arguments for parents who insist that they are
obligated to provide their children with the means to get ahead. Most
political philosophers take it as the task of the state to make education
accessible to those who would otherwise not be able to afford it, includ-
ing perhaps tutoring. Rather than denying the parental obligation of
enhancing one’s children, the ‘discrimination-objection’ provides a very
good argument for an egalitarian policy making genetic enhancements
available to all.
Savulescu accepts that some enhancements might make the individ-
ual better off, but harm the rest, e.g. by making someone manipulative
or cunning [12; p. 287]. For example parents might choose to alter the
DNA of their child in a way that makes them more cunning. Resulting
in “him” being better off, while the overall/average welfare decreases.
However, that argument can simply be taken in the opposite direction.
We might want to alter the DNA of embryos that will expectedly lead
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them to have worse lives, but will benefit the overall/average welfare.
This of course would also be an issue for the PPB. One cannot hold this
view and simultaneously be in favor of the PPB. Though the argument
might successfully undermine the PPB, a defense of said principle ex-
ceeds the scope of this paper. For a defense of the PPB I suggest the
work of Savulescu [10, 11, 12]. Even so, this might be an issue for the
state that should enforce restrictions, while parents are primarily con-
cerned with the welfare of their own child. The effects of one particular
enhancement on the overall/average welfare of society must in the eyes
of parents seem negligible. These arguments are usually stated in a much
broader sense, i.e. the availability of the technology itself. In fact, even
with restrictions on the technology the underlying parental obligation
doesn’t cease to exist. If the state is justified or obligated to stop such
genetic enhancements as a whole, be it by appealing to equality, freedom
or overall/average welfare, it is an open question whether that actually
frees parents from their obligation to genetically enhance their embryos.
There are several reasons to think that a prohibition of genetic enhance-
ments by the state doesn’t free parents from their obligation. First, it
would be over demanding to ask from parents to act against the best in-
terest of their child on grounds of marginal effects on the overall/average
welfare in the society. Second, it would be an incompatible view with the
PPB, as parents specifically have to aim for the best possible life. Third,
even when means to genetically enhance are not available, this doesn’t
mean that in case the genetic enhancements were available, there would
be no obligation to apply them.
5 Conclusion
To conclude, objections against genetic enhancements not weighing their
costs against their benefits must fail against the backdrop of the CP. Of
course maybe the PPB, thus premise (1) or the CP, thus premise (3) is
false, but the aim of this paper is to establish that the parental obligation
to genetically enhance their children logically follows once the PPB and
the CP are accepted. The ‘slippery slope’ is genuine. Objections trying
to establish that the individual costs outweigh the benefits of the tar-
geted agent, seemed to be more successful. However, a genetic alteration
that is not expected to lead to the creation of a being with higher welfare
cannot be called an enhancement in the welfarist sense. Merely showing
than that an enhancement in the sense of increasing some capacity is
contrary to the welfare of the child does not undermine the argument
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provided in this paper as it precisely rests on the welfaristdefinition of
enhancement. However, these cases might provide us with a valid ar-
gument against exceedingly strong optimism in discovering all -purpose
goods. Having explored the potential differences in the PPB and the
parental obligation to genetically enhance their children in section 4, I
conclude that even though they do not share exactly the same conse-
quences, the differences between them do not justify a different moral
standing, i.e. their obligatoriness. With the additional premise of lacking
relevant moral differences between the consequences of the two proce-
dures, we have successfully defended the conclusion (5). That is to say,
those who accept the PPB and the CP must bite the bullet and accept
that parents have the obligation to genetically enhance their embryos.
As a consequentialist Julian Savulescu should have no problem of doing
so.
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